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Today’s universities are, accordingly to Clark’s entrepreneurial model, sustained by 
managerialism, whereas collegialism may remain in contrast or work in a different 
way. More recent literature suggests the clash such as the potential for coexistence 
between managerialism and collegialism. The study analyses data from a survey of 
26 universities in 8 European countries, focusing on middle managers (MMs). The 
results show that at the level of the individual institutions, there are notable positive 
correlations between the presence of collegial and of managerial cultures. 
Multilevel regressions at institutional level are analysed, to ‘predict’ collegiality 
in light of the universities’ managerial culture and other factors affecting 
organizational change: accountability; distribution of discretional power; 
funding; impact of quality assurance (QA) and evaluation. The results illustrate 
that in more managerial universities, collegial culture increases above all when 
MMs believe that distance-steering tools (QA and evaluation) have had positive 
impacts. We ﬁnd that collegiality can indeed thrive, even when ‘managerially led’. 
Keywords: higher education; managerial culture; collegial culture; middle 
managers; entrepreneurial university 
1. Managerialism and collegiality: trade-off or coexistence? 
The seminal work by Burton Clark about the organizational change, namely towards 
entrepreneurial universities, is widely reckoned. In his words, the entrepreneurial uni- 
versity is pushed by managerialism (i.e. more line management), but even by ‘collective 
entrepreneurial action’ (Clark 1998, 4). Succinctly stated, ‘collegiality is then put to 
work in a different way’ (Clark 1998, 148). However, Clark himself was aware of 
the possible resistant and conservative role of collegialism, which would block the 
entrepreneurial university (Clark 1998, 131–132). Even the authority resembles this 
difference and clash. On the one hand, there is discipline-rooted authority: personal 
or collegial rule, guild and professional authority. On the other hand is enterprise- 
based authority: trusteeship and bureaucracy. These two sets of authority relate 
respectively to collegial and managerial cultures (Clark 1983, 107). 
    Managerialism is expected to assemble the traits of a complete organization, with 
positive outcomes in clarity of vision and strategy, rapidity of decision-making and 
efﬁciency through global management of resources. The collegial culture stresses 
different and seemingly opposing aspects: democracy among peers, the right of 
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veto, dispersion of inﬂuence and authority and bottom-up inﬂuence in decision- 
making. But how does the managerialism impact the collegial model? 
     The ﬁrst response to this question stressed the clash between the two cultures: the 
more a university is managerially led, the less it will be collegial, because the increas- 
ingly top-down structure of decision-making and the strengthening of accountability 
will detract from the individuality and the bottom-up voice of the peers. Accordingly 
to the literature (Shattock 2006; Ferlie, Musselin, and Andresani 2008), new public 
management (NPM) reforms will give impetus to managerialism and hinder collegial- 
ity, even though bypassing and evasive phenomena may arise as professionals try to 
defend themselves (Teelken 2012, 2015). Yet, too great emphasis on managerialism 
may bring about dangerous consequences, such as when it is presented in ‘hard’ 
version, impacting negatively the trust among scholars (Huisman and Currie 2004). 
In some case studies, managerialism indeed appears to be overpowering collegial 
bodies in determining the governance of universities (Carvalho and Santiago 2010). 
When managerialism involves the exercise of power by leaders and top-management 
ﬁgures, then a reduction in collegiality is observed to follow (de Boer, Goedegebuure, 
and Meek 2010). Other qualitative works suggest that academics still perceive them- 
selves as the inﬂuential ‘ﬂoor’ of the system, exerting bottom-up pressure against 
the threat of top-down management and its corporate-inspired principles (Santiago 
and Carvalho 2012). The ‘marketization’ of higher education is seen as eroding colle- 
giality in many continental European nations. Schimank (2005), for example, reported 
on managerialism as contributing to the demise of collegialism in German higher edu- 
cation. Leisyte (2014) detects scenarios of the changing role of scholars crisscrossing 
collective (more traditional and collegial) and individual (more managerial) features. 
     The traditional distribution of power in academic systems was termed ‘collegial’; 
however the reality has been described as a sort of ‘co-optation oligarchy’ (Bensimon 
1995; Hargreaves 1992). Scholars accepting this (essentially negative) view of collegi- 
ality have observed that, even though external pressures to some extent succeed impos- 
ing managerialism, the traditional assets of power within the oligarchies are simply 
reshufﬂed and reconstructed in order to minimize the changes. Collegialism, it is 
argued, has been developed as a sort of zero-sum game, where power is exercised by 
inﬂuential senior chairs and other dominant individuals in an oligarchy of guilds 
and ﬁefdoms (Trowler 2010). Carvalho and Santiago (2010) ﬁnd that middle managers 
(MMs) tend to use their roles to permit the ﬂoor an opportunity of a hearing, and to 
appease the quests from that level. 
     Other authors argue a possible survival of collegialism in managerial universities. 
Deem (2008) and Macfarlane (2005) have shed light on the current roles of not- 
scholars compared to those of ‘rank and ﬁle’ scholars in the rise of managerialism. 
Dill (2012) stresses that corporative approaches require more collective processes, 
especially in regard to issues of teaching and research. So, evidence and reﬂection 
have led to the conclusion that collegiality is a sort of ‘evergreen’ force that tends to 
fasten new managerial assets of whatever sort (Burnes, Wend, and Todnem By 
2013). Under certain conditions, collegiality could actually be rejuvenated, rather 
than disappearing in a pitched battle against managerialism. However these 
in-depth case studies investigate only the UK or countries of similar tradition, while 
continental Europe remains even farther from full understanding. Even Meek et al. 
(2010) suggest the potential existence of various paths of co-development for the 
two cultures. The ﬁrst would simply be a trade-off, where managerialism takes over 
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at the expenses of collegiality. A second possibility is that only managerial rhetoric 
would diffuse, without true change in practice. A third, more probable option is the 
emergence of new hybrid models. Such hybridization may occur in the encounter of 
managerial requirements and traditional assets within governing bodies. Even when 
governing bodies are removed or deeply reformed under legislation, traditional 
norms and values may somehow continue to survive (Fulton 2003). 
    De Weert (2001) and Reed (2002) both conclude that managerialism and collegi- 
alism can coexist within a university. Tapper and Palfreyman (2010, 53) suggest that 
collegiality may ﬁnd paths of enhancement in the new more managerialist environ- 
ment. In countries where NPM does not have long-standing roots, the debate is 
open. Mignot-Gérard (2010) reports that managerialism is successfully enacted by 
the rectors or presidents who are able to give substance to the new culture. Boffo 
(2010) takes a position arguing more strongly for a thesis of balance between the 
two cultures. Analysing the French and Italian cases, he afﬁrms that the introduction 
of managerial practices could ﬁnd paths to permanence alongside the existing collegial 
traditions. Reale and Primeri (2014) instead focus on the persistence of the collegial 
aspect, despite legislative reforms and a willingness to overcome or reduce it. 
    In any case, the concepts of ‘collegialism’ and ‘managerialism’ have been 
enriched with new details over the years. Newton (2002) discussed ‘new collegialism’ 
as a potential positive response to demands for accountability. Harvey (1995) warned 
that accountability could bring about ‘cloisterism’, meaning a kind of negative col- 
legiality, or ‘new collegialism’, which would be the positive response. ‘Soft’ manage- 
rialism – a managerialism leaving leeway of freedom to scholars – would be 
compatible with collegialism (Deem and Brehony 2005). Sahlin (2012) too suggests 
a decoupling of the two concepts. Hoecht (2006) has described how a high degree of 
managerialism could actually strengthen or generate collegialism among academics, 
stimulated by demands to report, to raise funds and accept some means of 
evaluation. 
    As a result, recent literature does not envisage a direct trade-off between manage- 
rial and collegial cultures as necessary. However the literature remains quite unclear 
on what inﬂuence the continued existence of collegial culture in a managerial 
context. Assuming that despite different paces in change and different path dependen- 
cies due to national differences, the quest for more managerialism in universities is 
nonetheless present and shared. But, under these circumstances, what is it that lets col- 
legialism endure or even increase? Under what conditions can collegialism continue to 
serve the essential function of ‘glue’ within corporative universities? 
    The aim of the current study is to try to respond in an explorative way, to the men- 
tioned questions by assuming the different degrees of managerialism at the insti- 
tutional level as the basis of comparison among the universities. We start from the 
Clark’s argument that a university, even an entrepreneurial one, is based on manage- 
rialism and, possibly, on collegialism. Despite the paces and paths are different, 
managerialism is a common phenomenon throughout Europe that recent reforms in 
higher education deeply pushed forward, generating organizational change within 
universities (Paradeise et al. 2009; Whitley 2010). Thus we want to shed light 
whether more managerial Universities are even those that are more collegial; if 
this is the case we can expect that: (i) the two culture basically coexist; (ii) collegiality 
is not hindered even in universities where managerialism largely affects the organiz- 
ational change. 
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    The next section introduces the sources of analysis. Section 3 describes the presence 
of the two cultures at the institutional level in descriptive statistics, illustrating some fea- 
tures of the sample. Section 4 explains the factors of organizational change used as a set 
of predictors, of different modes of coexistence between managerialism and collegiality 
and then proceeds with the in-depth analysis and commentary. The conclusions high- 
light in what sense and under what circumstances the two cultures can live in symbiosis. 
2. Empirical basis, methodology 
The empirical focus of the study is on MMs (both deans and heads of departments), 
which today represent a key level in university organizational dynamics. 
    The study relies on a sample of 26 research universities1 from eight European 
countries (France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Switzerland and 
UK) collected within the EUROCORE-EUROHESC-TRUE project, which were 
selected in order to represent different types as to the age, the size, the orientation – 
dividing between technical and generalistic universities. For each country, the 
sample include: (i) one generalistic and one technical university; (ii) one less presti- 
gious university, with a low score on research intensity. As a proxy of research inten- 
siveness, the Shanghai ranking index has been used where it seemed to work as an 
indicator. In the few cases where national universities were not registered by the 
index, research intensiveness has been identiﬁed in a way that makes sense nationally. 
    The data were collected in 2011, by means of questionnaires submitted to members 
of the governing bodies (Rector, Senate, Board, Central Administrator, MMs) of a total 
universe of 1420 people. From these, 697 valid responses were received (49% rate). 
Within this, we consider the sub-universe of MMs, for which there are a total of 235 
valid answers out of 491 total MMs (response rate of 47.9%). The criteria for the 
sampling were to consider the widest possible range of different public universities, in 
term of size, age, discipline concentration and international standing. Cronbach’s 
Alpha tests were run on single sets of Likert scales in order to measure reliability of 
the data collected. All the variables used satisfy the threshold of 0.6 or above that we 
assume in these variables high enough, considering the reduced number of items. 
3. Managerial and collegial cultures in the sample institutions 
To investigate the presence and relation of the two cultures in universities, two Likert 
scales are used. The respondents, regardless of the formal role they perform and the 
formal patters of the universities they were working in, had the opportunity to give 
an overall description of managerialism and collegialism (separately), assuming that 
they condensate the values, norms, beliefs and principles present in their universities. 
We assume in fact that scholars attribute about the same meaning to both ‘managerial 
culture ’ and ‘collegial culture’, throughout the countries and the universities. In more 
technical terms, considering the structure of the questionnaire, we consider those two 
Likert scale in face validity (one question goes straight to the subjective version of the 
concept) even though a description of a concept through more dimensions and indi- 
cators (construct validity) would be preferred under different circumstances (Gravetter 
and Forzano 2012, 71–106). 
    Interviewed declared the degree of managerialism and the degree of collegialism in 
their HEI.2 The academics perceive their universities as more collegial (mean 2.291) 
Table 1. General information and descriptive statistics of managerial and collegial culture per university, with Pearson’s correlation. 
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Source: Own elaboration on TRUE data set. 
Note: Old: established before 1968; recent: 1969 or after; size: small: up to 1000 enrolled students; medium: 1001–20,000; large: more than 20,001. 
*p < .05. 
**p < .01. 
***p < .001. 
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than managerial (mean 2.567), but for those identifying their organizational context as 
managerial, there is a slightly higher standard deviation (0.5268 and 0.2725, respect- 
ively). In particular, the British, Dutch, Italian, Swiss and German universities are 
generally more managerial; French, Norwegian and Portuguese less so. Table 1 pre- 
sents the details of the answers, by institution. 
     A further glance shows that among the whole sample, regardless of institutional 
afﬁliation, the two items of collegialism and managerialism have a positive and signiﬁ- 
cant correlation of 0.176 (p < .000; N = 662). This slightly implies that the more the 
respondents believe their university is collegial, the more they believe it is also manage- 
rial. Restricting the sample to the MMs alone, the correlation is considerably higher 
(0.324; p < .000; N = 218). These characteristics all agree with the recent developments 
in the literature regarding the key role of MMs within universities (Meek et al. 2010). 
They are also fully consistent with a separate investigation based on this same sample 
of 26 European universities, which focused on the shift of universities towards ‘com- 
plete organization’ patterns (Seeber et al. 2014). 
     The evidence of Table 1 encourages us to inquire more deeply into how the individ- 
uals in academia, particularly MMs, come to recognize themselves as part of a manage- 
rial or collegial university, and whether this can be associated with other factors. 
4. Factors affecting organizational change in universities 
In today’s universities, change (or any kind of reaction to changes in the external 
environment) is generally pushed by NPM and its modiﬁcations (Osborne 2006). Exter- 
nal reforms can inﬂuence the extent to which a university is or becomes more manage- 
rial by using: accountability at the institutional level; new balances of discretional 
power; evaluation and quality assurance (QA) as distance-steering tools; new rationales 
for funding. The reforms and the contexts for their operation are national in level; 
however, it is clear that the concepts behind them are common across all the European 
countries, and can be analysed using common references (Paradeise et al. 2009). At the 
same time, it has been identiﬁed that the cultures existing at the university level can 
oppose reforms, where these are seen as promoting undesired change (Stensaker et al. 
2012). We consider the importance of ﬁve factors in the coexistence of collegial and 
managerial cultures, which are often considered in the literature key items of organiz- 
ational change (Brunsson and Sahlin-Andersson 2000; Sahlin 2012): 
– Extent to which MMs have to be accountable to other governing bodies; 
– Distribution of decision-making power at a certain level of the organization; 
– Change of discretional power (increased or decreased) exercised by the differ- 
  ent Governing bodies of the universities in both management and academic 
  affairs (research and teaching); 
– Degree of importance placed on performance in funding allocations; 
– Impacts of ‘steering at a distance’ tools such as QA and evaluation. 
4.1. Accountability and decision-making power 
In recent years, universities have been more strictly obliged to provide reporting on 
what they do and how they work (McLendon, Hearn, and Deaton 2006), both 
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internally and with external stakeholders. The obligations towards external stake- 
holders are in particular expected to boost managerial practices (Maassen 2000). 
Given this, institutional accountability should bring about more responsibility and vir- 
tuous behaviours, even though the actual outcomes may fail to establish such results 
(Capano 2010). 
     Despite the increasing role of external or upwards forms of accountability in aca- 
demia (Stensaker and Harvey 2011, 245), in this study our variables refer to account- 
ability at the internal level, in ‘instrumental’ mode. The study thus stresses the current 
governing power of MMs in relation to other personages, in order to understand to 
what extent the middle layers of the hierarchies must account to the superior levels. 
Such accountability is considered to be linked to the quest for managerial and tight- 
coupling assets (Ackroyd, Kirkpatrick, and Walker 2007). The path of MM account- 
ability towards other actors is dependent on national context (de Boer, Enders, and 
Leisyte 2007); however, we assume that the accountability of MMs to other actors 
is in any case both relevant and comparable. 
     Decision-making power simply measures to what extent top management, MMs 
and shop ﬂoors have inﬂuence in several issues. The association of managerialism 
with the degree of power of the top management, for instance, is clear. 
4.2. Discretional power 
Discretional power concerns the freedom of scholars to govern themselves. From the 
opposite perspective, the discretional power of governing bodies measures to what 
extent they can interfere with academics. In universities, discretional powers are not 
complete: scholars cannot achieve complete control over academic affairs but, at 
the same time, other bodies cannot completely control managerial affairs. Fluctu- 
ations in the mixtures of discretional powers inﬂuence the extent to which manageri- 
alism can be introduced in a particular university. For Olssen and Peters (2005), new 
forms of governmentality place greater emphasis on hierarchical powers, and can 
result in de-professionalization and mistrust (Harvey 1995), especially in situations 
when units such as departments are forced to cede their authority to the upper hierar- 
chy (Taylor 2006). For this reason, it is relevant to understand to what extent MMs 
may have a voice in both the academic and managerial branches of university life in 
relation to managerialism and collegialism cultures. 
4.3. Funding 
Funding is a tangible lever for the accomplishment of change, especially given the 
current use of allocation mechanisms. One of the key aspects in the shift towards man- 
agerialism has been the introduction of criteria incorporating performance-based indi- 
cators in determining the allocation from government sources (Lepori et al. 2007). 
Funding has tended to shift from historically based criteria, with no change on the 
basis of performance, to formula allocations and negotiations based on performance 
indicators. In addition, the growing importance of project-based research funding in 
European countries is perceived as a push towards inter-university and inter-group 
competition. For project funding, the choice of the indicators used to measure the per- 
formance of a department or other middle levels (e.g. schools, faculties) can have a 
great effect on the development of competition. As a matter of fact, the inﬂuence of 
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funding allocation criteria on collegiality in more managerially led universities is not 
yet fully explored or understood (Liefner 2003). 
4.4. QA and evaluation of research 
QA and the evaluation of research and teaching are commonly considered as distance- 
steering tools. They also have a crucial role in the determination of reputation and 
prestige (Whitley 2010). Within a given context, QA and evaluation can: (a) assist 
in legitimating assets already held; (b) inﬂuence how reputations are conveyed and 
the extent to which they count. The imposition of QA has been found that at times 
lead to rejection of the entire strategy; however, it can also induce positive reﬂection 
among academics on their ways of organizing themselves, offering room for increased 
effectiveness in universities with viable managerial cultures (Amaral 2014). According 
to Amaral (2014), issues of propriety and use and misuse in the implementation of QA 
also have intrinsic bonds with trust or mistrust in the given university. 
    Research evaluation systems are organized differently in the various countries; 
however, their presence does increment the necessity of coping with external pressures. 
Evaluation can also provide public and more transparent ‘reputation’ (Whitley 2007). 
4.5. Variables in the data analysis 
The data presented in Section 3 have shown that managerialism and collegialism 
increase and decrease in parallel with each other in a quite stable way. Given this, it 
would be interesting to understand which predictors might explain how, at the insti- 
tutional level, the members of the governing bodies come to identify their universities 
as more collegial, given the degree of managerialism and other features. In Table 2, we 
thus develop the features above introduced. In the data analysis that follows, items of 
each feature represent single models for the explanation of collegialism at the insti- 
tutional level, while also checking against the presence of managerialism. 
     Accountability is considered in terms of three variables, indicating the extent to 
which MMs must be accountable to: rectors (MM8_4); boards (MM8_3); senates 
(MM8_5) as they represent inﬂuent bodies and are present in all HEIs under 
investigation. 
     Decision-making power is composed of three variables; under each variable, there 
is a total of 13 items dealing with key decisions on university government and manage- 
ment.3 For each item, all respondents are asked to indicate to what extent the power 
has been exerted by three levels: top level, middle and shop ﬂoor. Each score is on a 
scale of three points: high, some and low decision-making power. Thus the three vari- 
ables (DMP_top; DMP_mm; DMP_sf) measure the actual decision-making power of 
the three levels, where each variable is the sum of the points for the 13 items. The data 
allow us to depict how the respondents perceive the distribution of decision-making 
power within the university. 
     Two questions are posed concerning discretional power. The ﬁrst is: In recent years, 
how did the power of the following actors within your university change in relation to 
management affairs (leadership, budgets, accounting and administration)? (MM17 vari- 
ables). The second was: In recent years, how did the power of the following actors within 
your university change in relation to academic affairs (teaching and research)? (POW 
variables). This distinction is interesting, since it separates discretional power at the 
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The extent to which MMs have to be 
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In recent years, how each of the seven 
  actors has increased their discretional 
  power, over 
POW_1–7 Teaching and research 
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Aims of the budgeting rules 
Items 
Increase the efﬁciency of university 
   operations 
Demonstrate to the Government that 
   the university is efﬁciently using 
   resources 
Strengthen the power of the central 
   administration 
favour selected units 
# students enrolled in unit 
# graduates enrolled in unit 
Level of external funds acquired by unit 
Overall scientiﬁc reputation of the unit 
Compliance with strategic university 
   priorities 
Relationship between the MMs and 
   central management 
                     – 
                     – 
FRALLO_1–6 Important factors in funding allocation 
EVQA_pos 
EVQA_neg 
Evaluation and quality assessment (QA) Positive impacts of QA and evaluation 
Negative impacts of QA and evaluation 
Source: Own elaboration. 
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administrative and academic levels and fosters identiﬁcation of the degree of inﬂuence 
exerted by seven actors, with each actor representing an item. 
     Two questions address funding allocation. One of these concerns the BUDGET4 
variable. This question collects perceptions about the reasons for introduction of bud- 
geting rules. The concept is that funding allocation in the university is purposely 
unequal, and is administered according to rules that supposedly establish under 
which circumstances the different units can be funded, as indicated in the items. 
The question concerning the FRALLO variable takes a different perspective. It evi- 
dences the true factors that determine whether a unit is funded or not. In this 
second case, funding is assumed to be determined under rules that are already 
embedded in the university, meaning that the MMs would know what is inﬂuential 
and what is not. For this variable, the question is as follows: How important are 
each of the following factors in resource allocation to units? (1) Number of students 
enrolled in unit’s curricula; (2) number of graduates enrolled in unit’s curricula; (3) 
level of external funds acquired by the unit; (4) overall scientiﬁc reputation of the unit; 
(5) compliance with strategic university priorities. 
     Evaluation and QA are analysed through two variables assessing the actual 
impacts of these tools on the university, named EVQA_neg and EVQA_pos. The 
ﬁrst variable is a sum of negative consequences, encompassing ﬁve items: (1) conﬂicts 
among academics; (2) conﬂicts between managers and academics; (3) academic activity 
subjected to more norms and rules; (4) opportunistic behaviours in teaching and research; 
(5) constraints on academic freedom. The second variable sums positive impacts, 
encompassing four items, describing the improvement of: (1) teaching quality; (2) 
research quality; (3) transparency; (4) strategic decision-making. 
5. Multilevel data analysis 
In this study, we assume that managerialism is an independent variable as MMs may 
see it as an external change. Collegialism on the other hand is seen as an opposing, 
dependent variable enacted by MMs or above characters, whose outcome can be posi- 
tively or negatively associated with some factors, given the observed extent of 
managerialism. 
    We run the multilevel regressions to take into account the organizations as the 
main level that ﬁts the research question (Snijders and Bosker 2012). 
5.1. Singles models 
Table 3 shows the full list of predictors as described in the previous section. Collegial- 
ity is the dependent variable and the predictors are managerialism and, separately, 
each of the variables considered. In all cases, managerialism is a positive and statisti- 
cally signiﬁcant predictor of collegiality, at least at 0.01 or below. The more the MMs 
must account to their rector (MM_8_4), the more the culture of the university is col- 
legial, when the university is also more managerial (coeff. 0.1549). This indicates that 
bottom-up accountability triggers more collegial culture, but only if the one owed 
accountability is the rector. When managerialism is in place and accountability is 
owed to either the board (the most ‘managerial’ governing body) or the senate (the 
most ‘collegial’ body), collegial culture is not explained. 
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Table 3. Predictors of degree of collegial culture, given managerialism (right column) and 




















































































































































































































































Source: own elaboration on TRUE data set. 
*p < .05. 
**p < .01. 
***p < .001. 
    Decision-making power, whether at the shop ﬂoor, middle or top-management 
levels, does not have any signiﬁcant coefﬁcients. These predictors were therefore not 
used in the model exposed in Table 4. This evidence is nonetheless coherent with 
Tapper and Palfreyman (2010, 160), who clearly state that collegiality is unaffected 
by any varying placement of decision-making power within the hierarchy. 
    Discretional power is shown to have a clearer role in deﬁning and shaping the cul- 
tures. In fact, collegialism increases as MMs became more inﬂuential in issues con- 
cerning the administrative component of the university (MM_17_5; coeff. 0.1410). 
In contrast, the more the senate gains inﬂuence (MM_17_3; coeff. –0.1977) and the 
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Table 4. Single multilevel model to predict collegialism with 












































Source: Own elaboration on TRUE data set. 
*p < .05. 
**p < .01. 
***p < .001. 
more the culture becomes less managerial, then the less the institution is collegial. 
Symmetrically, the more the Senate weakens in inﬂuence and the university is more 
managerial, the more the university gains collegiality. This evidence is interesting 
because it suggests that in highly managerial universities, the senate could actually 
result as a hindrance to the development of collegial culture. The inﬂuence of the 
senate (MM_17_3) was not included in the general model as it would have prevented 
the inclusion of several universities that have no senate at all (i.e. the Norwegian ones). 
    Still considering Discretional power, but now over academic issues (teaching and 
research), the data tell a story of mirror image effects. Now, when chairs and individ- 
uals are more inﬂuential, collegiality increases with more managerialism (Pow_6 and 
Pow_7; coeffs. 0.2132 and 0.1796, respectively). On the contrary, more collegialism is 
associated with more managerialism when the boards have less power (Pow_1, coeff. 
–0.1740). In all other cases, the coefﬁcients are not statistically signiﬁcant. This offers 
useful information about the capacity for academic issues to be ‘ruled’ both by a more 
widespread base of scholars, and by managerial bodies. 
    Regarding funding, when MMs perceive that new budgetary rules have been estab- 
lished with the purpose of strengthening the power of the central administration 
(BUDGET_3; coeff. –0.1764) and managerialism is higher, collegiality declines. 
This means that the shift of power over funding towards top management, in 
unison with a higher managerial culture, is associated with a loss of collegiality. Col- 
legiality is instead explained with positive correlation when budgets are allocated 
according to the reputation of the units (FRALLO_2 coeff. 0.1034) and for number 
of graduates enrolled in the unit (FRALLO_4; coeff. 0.1152), where managerialism 
is also higher. 
    Regarding evaluation and QA, the aggregation of items clearly reveals that colle- 
gialism tends to decline where these tools are perceived as generators of conﬂicts and 
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uncertainty, and where managerialism is higher. In contrast, collegial culture increases 
where the presence of evaluation and QA are perceived as having impacted positively 
(EVQA_pos; coeff. 0.3193, the highest among all regressions), managerialism also 
being higher. In coherence, negative effects of evaluation and QA let collegiality 
diminish, being managerialism equal (EVQA_net coeff. –0.1864). 
5.2. The overall model 
The general model provided in Table 4 attempts to determine which factors, among 
those that were signiﬁcant in the previous discussion, are stronger. Managerial 
culture (‘uni_1’) is a positive predictor of collegiality (coeff. 0.1858), followed by only 
two other features that reach at least statistical signiﬁcance: ﬁrst is the perception of a 
positive impact from evaluation and QA (EVQA_pos; coeff. 0.3108); second is account- 
ability of MMs towards the rector or president (MM_8_4, coeff. 0.1783). All in all, we 
can say that collegiality is higher in more managerial universities, provided especially 
that the rules of the game are seen as aimed at fair competition (EVQA_pos), and sec- 
ondly when greater accountability is expected from MMs towards their rectors. 
6. Conclusions 
According to our exploration, collegiality is still present, and universities are still capable 
of self-regulating, despite the many deep changes that they have experience over recent 
years (Dill 2014). MMs are also still operating as a safety valve, or gateway, permitting 
any scholar to have a voice (Kekäle 2003). Indeed all forms of authority require some 
form of collegiality (Tapper and Palfreyman 2010, 168). Managerialism, in order to 
rule the university well, must also accommodate and guarantee room for some forms 
of collegialism, particularly to govern academic issues such as research and teaching. 
Collegialism is still a way getting things done within a given framework, and that frame- 
work can be more or less managerial. For MMs to carry out their key role, what appears 
to permit effectiveness is that they should have trust and conﬁdence (Tierney 2008). 
    The aim of our study has been to determine if and how the co-presence of manage- 
rialism and collegialism can come about, and which factors permit the survival and 
improvement of collegialism in a managerially led context. The quantitative evidence 
appears consistent with our expectations: universities are peculiar organizations where 
the two cultures can coexist, without necessarily trading off one to the other. The clear- 
est evidence is that collegialism, under conditions of higher managerialism and other 
factors held equal, is associated with distance-steering tools that have been enacted 
with positive impacts and with a stronger demanding role expressed by the leaders. 
    Given that managerialism is a rising trend throughout Europe, the next step would 
be to understand what permits mistrust to brew, or trust to blossom, at the basis of the 
academic sphere. Such information would be a further contribution towards more 
competitive and vital, in one word entrepreneurial, universities. 
Disclosure statement 
No potential conﬂict of interest was reported by the authors. 
European Journal of Higher Education 
Funding 
15 
This work was supported by Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia [grant number PEst-OE/ 
CED/UI0757/2013 & EXCL/IVC-PEC/0789/2012]. 
Notes 
1. The universities and MMs retained anonymity. 
2. The full statements are. My university has: (1) a strong managerial culture; (2) a strong col- 
   legial culture (1 is strongest; 5 lowest degree). 
3. The items are: (1) selecting leadership; (2) selecting the heads of units; (3) Establishing the 
   proﬁle of a new position; (4) selecting a candidate for a new chair in a unit; (5) setting employ- 
   ment conditions for a new chair; (6) setting the rules and procedures for evaluations of units; 
   (7) setting goals that units must achieve; (8) deﬁning the budgets of units; (9) establishing 
   new teaching programs; (10) setting the number of students for each curriculum; (11) evaluating 
   academics’ individual performance; (12) establishing research programs and research themes 
   for research units; (13) deﬁning policies for the management of academic staff. 
4. Full wording is as follows: Budgeting rules have been introduced to: (1) Increase the efﬁciency 
   of university operation; (2) demonstrate to the government that the university is efﬁciently using 
   resources; (3) strengthen the power of the central administration; (4) favor selected units. 
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